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CRYPTOGRAPHIC

2R-76

MAR 30 1954

CSD 4- 268

Chief, Signal Center
Chief, Communications Operations and Training Division
Chief, Communications Security Division

Intelligence Dissemination Network

1. Early in 1948 it was decided that a five-way intelligence dissemination network should be established to link CIA with the intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Department of State. Since this network was intended for use by CIA for the expeditious transmission of preliminary disseminations to using organizations, it was further decided that the National Security Agency would issue [] cryptographic equipment and associated cryptographic systems.

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2. In June of 1948 a wire circuit [] was installed between the CIA Signal Center and the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army, Pentagon Building. In July of 1950 the Department of State was tied into this network by the provision of a terminal, in series, off the CIA-ID circuit. This State Department terminal is located in the State Annex No. 1 at 23rd Street, Northwest. The planned circuits to the Navy and Air Force were never installed. NSA has, since the inception of this network, issued [] systems to CIA, G-2 and the Department of State only.

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3. At the present time the Navy and the Air Force are receiving the preliminary disseminations through the War Department of Army Cryptographic Center. The Department of State is receiving its disseminations over the regular CIA-State Department tie-lines. Only the G-2 circuit is being used as originally planned. On 12 November 1953 (Mr. Charles Goodman), Department of State, who serves on the staff of Mr. Park Armstrong, advised the undersigned that he has no intention of using this circuit, and would like to have the cryptographic equipment withdrawn. He did say, however, that he would like the circuit to remain in on a stand-by basis.

4. On the same date the writer discussed the requirement for the active ID circuit with Major Partridge of the Intelligence Division of the Army. Major Partridge advised that it would be acceptable to him to receive the disseminations through the War Department Cryptographic Center. He stated, however, that he would like to have the direct circuit remain on a stand-by basis. It was further agreed that this direct circuit would be tested on

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25X1A a monthly basis. At the same time it was suggested to Major Partridge that the [] be replaced with a one-time tape system.

5. As a result of the above discussions, the following has developed:

a. Effective in November, forwarding of intelligence dissemination traffic to ID on the ID circuit was discontinued. Dissemination traffic is sent to the Department of Army cryptocenter with instructions to pass to ID.

b. Periodic testing of the ID circuit was inaugurated.

c. The ID requested NSA to provide a system which would be readily adaptable to net expansion, thereby eliminating the possibility of using one-time tape, as we had suggested.

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d. NSA has advised us that they will issue a new set of [] key lists to become effective approximately 1 June. This, of course, will mean the retention of the [] on the ID circuit.

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6. The above historical review is forwarded for your information and to apprise you of the Intelligence Division's reaffirmation of its desire to retain a cryptographic system with CPT which would permit net operation in the event of an emergency. The [] cryptosystem for use on the ID link will be issued upon receipt from NSA. Upon receipt of the new system, monthly testing of the circuit will be continued until the circuit is reactivated for the passing of live traffic on a continuous basis.

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OC-S/HBF & SM: mgd (29 March 1954)

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Not in favor
a) Do not have the need
b) Don't see
 1 July 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: ICAPS MEMBERS

(Please take up the following matter, in the first instance, with the Standing Committee member of your Department, requesting an oral answer from his Chief within a week.)

Subject: Private Telecommunications System

Teletypes

1. The Army, Directorate of Intelligence, wishes to set up with CIA and the other IAC members a direct private telecommunication system which may also be used as a round-robin setup. This matter has been under discussion for some time and it is understood that the Navy Department, for some reason or other, is not in favor of it and that there is some delay on the part of State and Air Force (due to personnel?).

2. CIA would like to have such a new system started just as soon as possible between ORE and their contacts in the IAC agencies by direct wire and by round-robin also (minus the AEC and JIC who are not actively concerned with such operational matters).

3. CIA will pay for costs and maintenance, i.e., leasing wires, installing and maintaining machines, etc. The IAC members will pay for their own machines and their own operators.

4. There will be a 24-hour service for promptness and security purposes to greatly facilitate the work of CIA and the IAC members participating in the preparation of national intelligence.

5. There is being set up immediately between the Department of the Army, the Directorate of Intelligence, and CIA's Signal Center a single two-way line, but it is believed that this will be insufficient. CIA is anxious to get the approval and active cooperation of the other IAC members to enlarge this line into direct communications with them and on a round-robin system. The contact in CIA will then be direct with ORE, not through the Signal Center. *direct*

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